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1.0 SUMMARY
This report summarizes the discussion from a review organized by the Risk-Based Fire
Safety Experiment Project at the University of California, Los Angeles, and it includes the visual
aids used in the presentations in an appendix. The review was a workshop intended to guide
UCLA and NASA investigators on the state of knowledge and perceived needs in spacecraft fire
safety and its risk management. The discussions and conclusions reinforce the viewpoint that
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods, which are currently not used, would be of great
value to the designs and operation of future human-crew spacecraft. The discussions also
stressed the importance of understanding and testing smoldering as a likely fire scenario in space.
A need for smoke damage modeling was also noted, since many fire-risk models ignore this
mechanism and consider only heat damage.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the presentations and findings of a review meeting organized by
the Risk-Based Fire Safety Experiment Project at the University of California, Los Angeles. The
project is sponsored by the NASA In-Space Technology Experiment Program 0N-STEP), and
its principal goal is to develop and perform experiments based on Probabilistic Risk (or Safety)
Assessment (PRA or PSA) needs that will be used in models to quantify fire risk in human-crew
spacecraft.
The review was held at UCLA on October 31-November 1, 1991, and it was intended to
guide the UCLA and NASA investigators on the state of knowledge and perceived needs in
spacecraft fire safety and its risk management. The review was organized as a workshop with
presentations on specified subjects and discussions by the participants during and following the
presentations. The names and affiliations of attendees, including those who made formal pre-
sentations, are given in Appendix I.
The following sections briefly introduce the presentations of the review workshop, cover-
ing the topics of current safety practices, probabilistic risk assessments, combustion science in
the spacecraft environment, and the specific hazard of smoke in spacecraft. The visual aids used
in the presentations are in Appendix II.
3.0 CURRENT SAFETY PRACTICES
3.1 Design-to-Preclude Strategies
There are three necessary elements for fire: fuel, oxygen, and an ignition source. These
three elements form what is known as the fire "triangle." Excluding one of the three legs of the
triangle assures safety from fire. However, the complete removal of any element is impractical,
if not impossible, in a human-crew spacecraft. Realizing that fire threats exist, designers may
use the tool of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) to reduce risk to an acceptable level.
Several of the contractors working on spacecraft projects stressed the fact that a design-to-
preclude strategy, that is, the a priori reduction of fire elements, is very important to their design
approach. J. Pauperas of McDonnell-Douglas Space Systems Company in Huntington Beach,
California, discussed many of the threats to orbital spacecraft and what steps are currently under-
taken by engineers and designers to preclude catastrophes. Many risk consultants agree that,
even with these risk-reduction strategies, there is a need for outside monitoring to counteract
possible bias, intentional or unintentional, that arises where the designer must defend his or her
own design. Some contractors already cooperate in this regard; however, several of the risk
experts commented on the reluctance of other contractors to open themselves to outside moni-
toring.
R. Friedman of the NASA Lewis Research Center, in his presentation noted that, in addi-
tion to the fire elements already expected in current spacecraft, future missions will introduce
greater fire risks through their complex configurations, varied crew activities, and scientific and
commercial operations. Long-duration orbital missions also increase the probability of exposure
to potential fire hazards.
3.2 Material Selection
Despite the design-to-preclude strategy, flammable materials are likely to be found in what
is termed Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), according to H. Kimzey, private consultant
to McDonnell-Douglas in Houston, Texas. For the Space Station Freedom, currently under
design, these items will include paper, towels, food, and electrical equipment. In addition, the
possibility arises that Freedom crew members will bring on board other items creating potential
f'u'ehazards,suchasmagazinesor souvenirs,for thecomfortsof living during the long mission
lengths.
NASA has methods and standards to assess material flammability through pass-fail tests,
but testing of necessity must be conducted in a normal gravity environment. There is no proven
correlation between normal-gravity and microgravity (near-zero gravity) flammability, and several
scientists voiced concerns over material selection based solely on normal-gravity testing. Accor-
ding to T. Ohlemiller of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NASA may
want to consider supplemental tests, such as those with incident thermal radiation, for more
realistic data. Ohlemiller's experiments have shown that materials that pass the NASA test cri-
teria for resistance to flame spread may show appreciable flame-spread rates, if preheated. He
also felt that the conventional NIST ignition-delay, heat release, and flame-spread tests provide
a more complete, quantitative picture of flammability than the NASA pass-fail test.
For more information on these topics, see the presentations in Appendix II given by
R. Friedman, H. Kimzey, T. Ohlemiller, and J. Pauperas.
4.0 PSA AND FIRE RISK IN HUMAN-CREW SPACECRAFI_
The complexity of engineering systems and the requirements for reliable and safe opera-
tions have created the need for the development of models that accurately represent these sys-
tems. The occurrence of major accidents (e.g., Bhopal, Chernobyl, Challenger) has focused the
attention of the public on the safety of these facilities and has accelerated the development and
use of these models. It is clear that major failure events of interest are rare and any decision-
making process that involves such events must include the large uncertainties that are associated
with their occurrence.
Although the established fire-risk concepts and methodologies have been developed for
industrial and nuclear power plants, they can also be applied to human-crew spacecraft. A PSA
of fires may be described as a four-step process) The first step is identify "critical locations."
The second step is to assess the frequency of fires. The third step is to determine the fraction
of fires which damages critical components. The last step is to determine the conditional fre-
quency of severe consequences, given that damage to critical components has occurred.
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Accident scenariosarisefrom theidentificationof "critical locations." In nuclearpower
plants,theseareareaswherea fire candisableredundantcomponents.In Freedom, any fire will
be a major concern. However, some locations will be more important than others. For example,
any region of Freedom where a fire could disable a major system is much more important than
a region where a fire could destroy a light panel. Much work has already been done in deter-
mining accident scenarios. Most fire scenarios that have been examined are based on incidents
originating within a closed compartment termed a "rack," which is essentially a wall drawer. 2
The occupied Freedom volumes, or modules, will be constructed of banks of many racks sur-
rounding the central core volume on four sides. Most of the racks will contain electrical equip-
ment; many may also contain flammable solids or fluids.
To assess the fraction of fires which damage critical components, the competition between
fire growth and suppression must be determined. Suppression efforts include both the time to
detection and the actual suppression time. This is not an easy determination. Much work in
terrestrial applications has been done in this area over the years; and, for an actual analysis
(usually for nuclear power plants), the growth part is usually determined through the use of
computer models, such a COMPBRN Hie. 3
Space Station Freedom represents a tremendous effort in terms of dollars and labor. Fire
on board the space station is the threat with potentially the most catastrophic consequences. 4 Fire
threatens the occupants not only with the obvious dangers of heat, toxic gases and structural
failure but also in other, more subtle ways. Trace constituents generated by both combustion and
extinguishment can contaminate the atmosphere and corrode electrical and sensitive components
over periods of time. 5'6 Repeated false alarms due to oversensitive detectors can disrupt the
activity schedules and reduce the crew's confidence in the protective systems.
In the past, missions of several weeks were deemed as long-term, but, as R. Friedman
pointed out, Freedom has a planned 30-year or greater lifetime. Due to this longer service life,
and the increased stresses from greater mission responsibilities and longer crew duty periods, plus
new and increased quantities of onboard materials and processes, the value of PSA should be
apparent. W. Fuller of PLG, Inc. in Newport Beach, California stated that the power of PSA lies
in the ability to analyze all conceivable accident sequences and prioritize their contributions to
risk. Even though PSA is design specific, it can be used in an evolutionary process where
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analystscooperatewith designersthroughoutthedevelopmentof the project. The result is an
improved design, without the needfor retrofit or redesign. Also, through this interaction,
designersbecomemorerisk awarein their designs.Healsostatedthat for Freedom, the Japan-
ese Experiment Module (JEM) incorporates a complete PSA, but the U.S. modules include only
qualitative safety assessments in their planning.
Although this review centered solely on the fire threat, it should be noted that other
threats also exist. For example, explosion, collision, radiation and tumbling are additional threats
that can also have serious consequences. 7,s M. Vedha-Nayagam of Wyle Laboratories in Hunts-
ville, Alabama stated that, even if the fire is the sole objective of our efforts, its threat is multi-
faceted. The emphasis must be focused on risk minimization, not just the understanding of some
aspects of combustion in microgravity. Due to testing time constraints, microgravity experiments
for fire safety need to be designed to obtain the most information possible from each trial, with
appropriate test matrices developed in advance.
For more information on these topics, see the presentation in Appendix 11 given by
G. Apostolakis, R. Friedman, W. Fuller, J. Pauperas, and M. Vedha-Nayagam.
5.0 COMBUSTION SCIENCE IN MICROGRAVITY
Several presentations dealt strictly with combustion science in microgravity. Since a
meaningful risk assessment must rely on understanding the physical phenomena involved, there
were many ideas and concepts mentioned that could be utilized in a risk-based approach.
R. Altenkirch of the Mississippi State University stated that, due to the absence of gravity
and the accompanying buoyancy effects, the mechanisms of combustion are driven by transport
other than natural convection, most notably radiation, and even simple heat-balance analyses must
include radiation. Conduction may also be important, if thermally thick fuels are tested.
T. Ohlemiller of NIST presented some results that showed the two ways in which radia-
tion is important. First, it can act as a feedback mechanism, so that the heat of the flame is
directed back onto itself, driving the reaction faster. It can also preheat the fuel ahead of the
flame, which can have a major impact on how the combustion process is driven.
The smolderinghazardwasdiscussedby C. Fernandez-Pellof theUniversityof Califor-
nia at Berkeley. Although smolderingis mostlya fuel-controlledprocessin microgravity,it can
representa major hazard. Smolderingcanevenoccurin a vacuum,if oxygenis retainedin the
fuel matrix. Several scientistsexpressedskepticismon whether any useful results can be
obtainedin the availableshort-termtestbedfacilities. Forexample,airplaneplatformscansup-
ply a maximum of twenty-five secondsof sustainedmicrogravity. Smolderingprocessesin
microgravity will needto be examinedon the order of minutesto obtain useful results,and
eventuallythesetestswill haveto beconductedon theShuttleor Freedom.
P. Ronney of Princeton University discussed the use of extinguishing agents. Innovative
agents, such helium and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), have been found to have excellent extinguish-
ing properties. These evaluations are based on extinguishment limits observed in tests with
premixed atmospheres diluted by the agent. Long-duration tests with the agent introduced to
extinguish an established fire have not been performed.
T. Steinberg of the White Sands Test Facility in White Sands, New Mexico discussed his
work on the combustion of metals in microgravity. These experiments are performed in pure
oxygen environments at extremely high pressures (approximately 7 MPa or 1000 psi). One
interesting note here was the ensuing discussion on calculating heat release. From precise tem-
perature and pressure measurements, both the heat release and oxygen depletion can be calculated
using simple thermodynamic relationships. This approach seems feasible for quiescent environ-
ments, but it may prove difficult to apply to flow-type experiments due to the inaccuracies that
would be encountered in measuring pressure.
One final topic mentioned during the discussion period by M. Delichatsios of the Factory
Mutual Research Corporation in Norwood, Massachusetts is it may be possible to use key flam-
mability properties, such as surface temperature or heat of combustion, to predict the micro-
gravity flame-spread rate. If such relationships could be discovered, material flammability
properties could be incorporated into models that predict flame spread rates.
For more information on these topics, see the presentations in Appendix II given by
R. Altenkirch, C. Femandez-Pello, T. Ohlemiller, and P. Ronney. T. Steinberg's presentation was
on slides, and no overheads were available. M. Delichatsios' viewgraphs are grouped with those
of D. Karydas.
6.0 SMOKE
Many computer models for fire attribute damage solely to heat release and ignore smoke
generation and its damaging effects. However, according to M. Delichatsios and D. Karydas,
also from FMRC in Norwood, Massachusetts, smoke can be both highly toxic and highly corro-
sive. Recent work has shown that not only should smoke effects be considered in fire models,
but, in fact, smoke may be more damaging than heat. Several important characteristics of smoke
are particle composition, particle size, particle density, particle charge, and particle morphology.
These charactersfics, along with velocity distributions, can be incorporated into computer codes
(e.g., MAEROS 2) to determine the damaging effects of smoke?
The smoke characteristics need to be supplemented with the smoke deposition rates. It
is hoped that this information could be used to determine a critical deposition rate. The rate
would directly relate to a probabilistic damage model for a component, from which a damage
distribution could be assessed. This type of damage model may not be necessarily accurate, but
it offers a more realistic approach than a model based exclusively on heat release.
For more information on these topics, see the presentations in Appendix II given by
D. Karydas and M. Delichatsios (one set).
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
Some participants at the review workshop expressed their strong belief that an extensive
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of the Space Station Freedom needs to be conducted.
Because of the effort in dollars and labor that will be spent on Freedom, all safety precautions,
including the use of PSA, should be used to minimize threats. Although several scientists in the
combustion field expressed concern over the use of PSA (primarily over the unavailability of
sufficient information to perform a defensible PSA), most attendees, particularly those in the
spacecraft safety and risk fields, agreed that this approach is very promising. Through the identi-
fication of the major hazards, a first step can be taken into quantifying the fire risk of human-
crew spacecraft.
Smoldering is a likely spacecraft fire scenario, producing toxic gases, ash, and other
undesirable products. A major question discussed by the participants is whether or not smolder-
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ing testscan be performedin a ground-basedmicrogravityenvironment. Obviously, the drop
towersdo not provide the time needed;and,evenwith the useof airplanefacilities, therewill
not beenoughtime in sustainedmicrogravityto obtainuseableresults. In airplanes,continued
parabolic flight pathscan be flown, giving longerperiodsalternatingbetweennormal(actually
increased)gravity andreducedgravity. However,thereis concernthat, during thegravityphase
of theseflights, the smoldering experiment may flash over, ending the smoldering test. Thus,
full and complete smoldering tests will most likely have to performed in a space environment.
Another question posed was that of relating smoke production to smoke damage. In
terrestrial fires, heat is normally treated as the contributing factor for damage. Many computer
models, which deal with fire growth to damage, do not even consider smoke. However, recent
work done in the field has shown the importance of smoke in fn'e scenarios.
Finally, given the success of the workshop in bringing about useful discussion and idea
exchange among specialists in the several fields involved, participants expressed the desire for
continued encounters of this nature at regular intervals in the future as the studies progress.
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HEAT RELEASE MODEL
where:
rl:
In"
.Hf:
Q = nrhHr
burning efficiency
mass bunting rate
total heat of combustion
(w)
where:
Cv:
WIN:
Ventilation-Controlled Fires
rh = CvI,i:IN (kg/s)
proportionality constant dependent upon the type of fuel being burned
mass rate of flow of air into the compartment
where:
rh;:
Cs:
Fuel-Surface Area Controlled Fires
fn /A _ - rh "
= ,i,; + C_,",_ (kg/m =)
fuel-dependent burning rate constant
burning rate augmentation constant (the inverse of the heat of vaporization)
external heat flux impinging on the fuel element's surface
G. Apostolakis, UCLA
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FUEL ELEMENT THERMAL RESPONSE MODEL
8T 62T
_T _x 2
(aT) = fi( T.,_, - 7"/)
- k x.o
where:
a: thermal diffusivity (rll2/s)
T_:
T/c:
k: thermal conductivity (W/m K)
h: convective heat transfer coefficient (W/M 2 K)
temperature of fuel element's immediate environment (K)
fuel element surface temperature (K)
c: emissivity of the fuel element
6
a: Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.670 x 10 -_ W/m 2 K4)
external heat flux (W/m 2)
G. Apostolakis, UCLA 23
MASS TRANSFER MODEL
For the upper region:
I_ E + l_v_ - I_otrr + l_v,otrr
For the lower region:
w_ + w,.,._+ ,_ = w_ + w,.,.o_
For the compartment:
_,_ + Wv._+ rv,.,.,,_+ m = wo_ + Wv.o_+ rv,.,.o_
where:
rh: fuel mass burning rate
WujN: mass flow rate of fresh air into the lower region by forced ventilation
Wu, otrr: mass flow rate of gases out of the lower region by forced ventilation
mass flow rate of fresh air into the HGL by forced ventilation
Wv, otrr: mass flow rate of hot gases out of the HGL by forced ventilation
WxN: mass flow rate of incoming fresh air through the doorway
Wotrr: mass flow rate of outgoing hot gases through the doorway
J_E: mass flow rate of air entrainment due to plume flow (l_'vt.), wall jet (I_w), and
doorway mixing jet(l_j)
- W,L+ Ww+ W,
G. Apostolakis, UCLA
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FIRE INDUCED DOOR FLOW
(Rockett's two-zone model)
× (HD- _)3:_
w_: 3 qW_po 1 - 7o (z.
where:
Ci: doorway inflow coeffident
Co: doorway outflow coefficient
C _..
G. Apostolakis,
W. (MEASURED)/_ O"HEOREFIC.AL)
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AN INTEGRATED STRUCTURE FOR TECHNICAL
ISSUE RESOLUTION*
a physically based methodology
that Integrates experiments, analysis
and qualifications
OBJECTIVES
O To integrate experiments, analysis and uncertainty
qualification by means of a methodology that is
systematic, comprehensive, auditable and practical.
To ensure that special models or computer codes
used to resolve a safety issue have the capability
to scale-up processes to relevant conditions.
To provide a proper balance between experiment
and analysis and assure a cost-effective resolution
of a safety issue.
A method developed by Dr. Novak Zuber to address complex technical issues.
I. Carton, UCLA 43
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SASM ELEMENT
EXP£RIMENTAL
REQUIREMENTS
i
SPECIFY [I
EXPERIMENTAL
OBJECTIVES
SASM ELEMENT 2
EVALUATION AND SPECIFICATION
FOR EXPERIMENTS AND TESTING
INSUFFICIENT
INFORMATION
3
PERFORM
EXPLORATORY
EXPERIMENT
DISCOVERY OF NEW
PHENOMENA AND OR
COUPL ING EFFECTS
DURING TESTING
2
PERFORM
SCALING
ANALYSES
SUFFICIENT
INFORMATION
4
IDENTIFY
SIMILARITY
CRITERIA
SPECIFY lET
FACILITY &
EXPERIMENTS
EVALUATE
EFFECTS OF
DISTORT IONS IMPORTANT
NOT
IMPORTANT
i
I
i
L_
ADEQUATE
SPECIFY SET
FACILITY &
EXPERIMENTS
DEVELOP MODELS
AND/OR
CLOSURE RELATIONS
EVALUATE
SCALEUP
CAPABILITY
6
SASM ELEMENT 3
DA TA BASE
A CQUISI TION
AND DOCUMENTA TION
ESTABLISH EXPERIMENTAL DATA BASE[AND QUANTIFY ITS UNCERTAINTIES !
PROV IDE DOCUMENTATION
• FACILITY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
AND SPECIFICATIONS
• TEST SPECIFICATIONS AND RESULTS
• EXPERIMENTAL DATA
I
.... PIRT
I0
II
R
CODE
DEVELOPMENT
TECHN ICAL
ISSUE
RESOLUTION
W ITH SPECIAL
MODELS AND
THEIR
UNCERTA INTY
QUANTIFICATION
TECHNICAL
ISSUE
RESOLUTION
W ITH FROZEN
CODE AND
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OBJECTIVES OF SEVERE ACCIDENT SCALING
METHODOLOGY
1. To provide a scaling methodology that is sytematic and
practical, auditable and traceable,
2. To provide the scaling rationale and similarity criteria,
3. To provide a procedure for conducting comprehensive reviews
of facility design, of test conditions and results,
4. To ensure the prototypicality of the experimental data, and
5. To quantify biases due to scale distortions or due to non-
prototypical conditions.
I. Carton, UCLA 48
THE TWO TIERED APPROACH
The top-down approach scales the behavior of the whole system
(synergism) whereas the bottom-up approach focuses on specific
processes (monergism).
Specific mechanisms found to be important to the whole are
investigated at the lower level, their significance is synthesized and
evaluated at the top one.
Together the two approaches provide a methodology that is practical
and that yields technically justifiable results.
Scaling is determined by the question addressed, that is, by the details
of information one seeks.
As information details are reflected in hierarchical levels, scaling is
determined by the level of resolution, that is, by the hierarchical level
at which the problem is to be formulated.
The number of scaling groups decreases with increasing hierarchical
level.
The scaling groups are constraints on the experimenter, the lower
hierarchical level having more constraints.
Reduction in constraints at higher hierarchical level is paid for by a loss
of information content and details.
As more detailed and specific questions arise that need to be addressed
at lower hierarchical levels, the more constraints must be met.
X. Carton, UCI_
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Radiative Effects on Spread Rate
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Evaluation of Gas-to-Surface Radiation
x=O,y=O _7
Xmax
V ._. QtQgsr J i:t" dx;gsr gbr
0
X
max
= Y q""br ds
boundary
f _ gs_ ; _(x) -
Q'gbr
• It
qgsr (x)
!
gsr
_l"gsr(X) = f V(x) 4aprS J_(T 4 T4) dxdy
101
R. Altenkirch, Mississippi State Univ•
.Surface Radiation Effect on Spread Rate
:.00
0.80
o
- I
o.,_oJ
-'2
P= 1.5 arm.
&e &
Oxygen Level
o_
o •
a
Ps':= 0.0428 kg/m 2
O0 0.10 0.2 o 03 0 0.40
o 30_
a 60_
• 70_
a 100 %
o
O.SO 0.60
102
R. Kltenkirch, Mississippi State goiv.
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TWO ZONE MODEL
HOT CEIUNG LAYER
"_ Cable Tray
H
H'
Hc
I
H¢
Distance of zone interface from room floor (m)
Distance of zone interface from cable tray (m)
Room height (m)
Distance from cable tray to room ceiling (m)
D. Karydas & M. Delichatsios,
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V a (kpc) g (Tf-Tig) =
V-"'
kpc (Tig-Ts) =
_=v a (kpc) g (Tf-Tig) 2, in kW 2/m 3 ,
I=kpc (Tig-T s) =
D. Karydas & M. Delichatsios,
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HORIZONTAL FLAMESPREAD VELOCITY ON CABLE TRAY
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
Model Prediction Updated With Sampling Evidence
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PDF of PARTICLE FLOOR DEPOSITION
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FLOOR PARTICI,F. DEPOSITION
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Probability of Equipment Failure
Exposed to Carbon Fibers
-(E/Em)
p=l-e
• with
E : exposure level in fiber-seconds
F_an: average exposure causing damage in fiber-seconds
D. Karydas & M. Delichatsios,
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GENERIC BUSINESS/INDUSTRY EQUIPMENT WITH MEAN
E)(POSURE TO FAILURE VALUES (_=IN FIBER SECONDS/ME'I--LR 3)
Equipment Failure
Parameter
Input power service equipment -- transformers.
breaker_, switchgears
Power distribution buses and panels
Auxiliary power supply in l_raIIel
with power input
Standard--size computer used as a central
facility controller
Keybord display unff
High-voltage power _upply at a machine
_afJon
10 e
10 e
10 6
Interface unit used to buffer central
computer_ to line controllet_
Manual controller, associated with each
electrically-operated machine
IXini-computer used as o programmable
controller
10 e
10 e
10 8
Microprocessor used as a controller
High-voltage motor controller
Machine station servo--mechanism
Heater or oven Control
10 e
10 e
10 e
10 e
Device to measure temper(Tture, thickness.
weight, position, motion, etc.
10 v
I II I IIIII
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Probability of Equipment Failure
Exposed to Smoke Particles
p=l
-{ (c-3)/co}
C
with
C : surface concentration of smoke particles in gg/cm 2
Co: average surface concentration of smoke particles
causing damage, in gg/cm 2
D. Karydas & M. Delichatsios, FMRC
Fac_tory - rvlutuai Researcn
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PROCEDURE FOR HARDWARE CERTIFqCATION
l REQUEST FOR HARDWARECERTIFICATION
NO
YES COMPOI_IENT
T <0.S?
NO
YES
TOXICOLOGI!
ASSESSES BY
DEFAULT )EFAULT MAXI
MAC NO
NO
REJECT?
RETEST?
NO
YES
YES
r MUASENTTO !
TOXICOLOGIST
FOR REVIEW
COMPONENT 1REJECTED
I REJECTED
IFOR FLIGHT
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PROCEDURE FOR TOXICITY ASSESSMENT
Toxicologist sets Require-
ments for Acceptance of
Materials/Assembled
Articles
J Payloads
GFE
Material/Article
Test Data to
Materials Org.
Materials Org.
Reviews for
Compliance with
Requirements
Spacecraft
Hardware
NO
Rejected, retested,
or Sent to Toxicolo.
gist for Approval
6-hour Offgassing 1
Test Data to
Toxicologist JToxicologist
Certifies Acceptable i Certifies Acceptable
or Rejects [or Rejects
Other Toxicological IHazards
_L No
I Reject/Retest J
YES
II=
Y
Materials Org.
C_rtifies Hard-
ware Acceptable
YEs
Toxicologi_t Evaluates
Overall t_ission
Toxicological Hazards
Memo Verifying 1
Toxicological Safety
of Mission
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The Design of Spacecraft, including Material Selection,
And its Role in Accidental Fire
Generally speaking, the interior of a manned spacecraft is
designed with approximately the same kinds of equipment as might
be found in a home or workplace. This infers that accidental fires
are possible since the atmosphere will typically be ambient air
containing 20 percent oxygen, and the materials are, in some cases,
flammable. The lessons learned since the 1960's when Mercury,
Gemini, and Apollo were flown with pure oxygen, and specifications
were still being written, has provided us today with much test data
regarding the flammability of materials and other design details, so
that the possibility of an accidental fire has been minimized. We
have recognized the need for fire detectors and extinguishing
capability, and crews are trained according to the flight objectives.
But abundant energy, which might be released in the event of a
series of failures and cause a fire, is available. Thus we have
reduced the risk considerably. Yet we might compare a residence or
work-place as to what are the possible courses of action for the
occupant. The main differences, of course, are the consequences of a
fire.
GROUND vs SPACE
On the ground we typically can:
1. Assess the situation - deciding whether we can deal
with it using available resources, or
2. Evacuate the area and call for help from the
professionals who will soon arrive equipped and fully trained.
In space, specifically, he or she will:
1. Assess the situation and
2. Take appropriate action utilizing what is provided on
the scene. With advance planning this may be:
a. Verify there is an actual emergency.
b. If a fire, turn off power in affected area, but
leaving area lights on.
c. Turn off air flow.
d. Assist any injured crewmen.
e. Isolate by evacuation and, if appropriate, close
hatches.
f. Release extinguishing agent or vent the
compartment.
153
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DESK3NERS ROLE
The designer's role in minimizing a fire includes:
1. Careful selection of materials that are self-
extinguishing for the habitable environment. [NASA NHB 8060.1B]
2. Consider alloys with adequate stress corrosion
properties for a given application. [NASA MSFC-SPEC-522B]
3. Provide a layout to preclude propagation of failures as
from one flammable material to another, or from a payload to the
vehicle.
4. Select pressure vessels that will not rupture under
combined loads (mechanical, thermal, etc.) or that will fail in a non-
catastrophic manner.
5. Provide adequate factors of safety for lines and
fittings.
6. Allow for decompression or recompression consistent
with the flight profile.
7. Provide for hazardous materials:
a. Fluid compatibility.
b. No single point failures, including heaters
failing "ON".
c. Batch lot control.
8. Avoidance of possible toxic consequences from
offgassing in manned areas. [JSC 20584]
9. Avoidance of outgassing of exterior materials [NASA
SP-R-0022A: 1% TWL, 0.1% VCM] which can produce a loss of
critical materials causing plating or sublimation of unwanted
coatings, adversely influencing"
a. Thermal coatings
b. Dielectric property of surfaces
c. Optical Surfaces
d. Solar Panels
10. Avoid incompatibilities with atomic oxygen on
exterior surfaces.
11. Provide thorough, accurate, documentation.
a. Keep accurate up-to-date records of what is
actually built into the flight hardware.
b. Avoid loose descriptions such as "Ethylene-
propylene rubber" or even "Fluorocarbon
elastomer per MIL-R-83248, Class 1, brown."
c. Document and retain Waivers and Material Usage
Agreements (MUA).
H. Kiu_ey, McDonnell Douglas
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12.
d. Make detailed photographic coverage accessible
for the life of the spacecraft.
Verify design by a Systems Test covering nominal
and off-nominal operation.
CUSTOMER'S ROLE
Other factors may directly or indirectly influence a possible
in-flight spacecraft "event'. These factors are, generally speaking,
government-furnished items called GFE (Government Furnished
Equipment) which are supplied to make the spacecraft more
habitable, items of housekeeping such as food, clothing, hygiene,
sleep, and recreation items.
Such things are, of course, necessary for human beings to
survive and to be productive. And there aren't adequate substitutes
for paper, for example, (for written instructions and other needs
such as tissue paper), fabrics for clothing (and towels), food items,
medical items, and the various maintenance items. So without non-
flammable substitutes these items are carried with approval via a
Material Usage Agreement (MUA).
TRADE-OFFS
The longer the space flight the more complex that area
becomes. For example a decision has to be made on whether or not
the crew should take sufficient socks and underwear to provide two
changes of these garments per week discarding them after wear, or
whether it is more effective to provide a washing machine and dryer
so only a few items per person will suffice. A very long mission
such as to Mars, taking about two and one-half years, or a lunar
outpost to be manned for a substantial period of time will probably
have such equipment as well as a trash compactor, some special
food preparation equipment (such as a microwave oven with a food
warmer and possibly a fry pan, a broiler, and a toaster), a hair dryer,
and other such amenities, with the above list emphasizing those
which can contribute to an accidental fire if misused or if various
safeguards fail. In the realm of maintenance there is the heat gun,
the soldering iron, and perhaps welding equipment if major
spacecraft assembly is required. And regarding maintenance, there
is the need to change filters at appropriate times, and to dispose of
the filtered material safely.
Motor-driven items, in the early days when the atmosphere
was pure oxygen, involved only iduction motors. But many off-the-
shelf things such as a vacuum cleaner, electric drill, battery
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operated screwdrivers, or hair dryers come with motors which have
brushes. These are an ignition source if in an environment
containing a flammable gas mixture.
Most electric equipment is not built for use in a zero-gravity
environment which may include large amounts of liquid condensate
from spilled fluids. Again, in early designs, we have seen quantities
of liquids appearing in various regions, from sources unknown,
making the crew and ground controllers happy that total
waterproofing had been part of the design. And so today, as we
provide various electrical items, if coatings are not provided
everywhere, and of a design which can survive the service life of the
item, we are faced with electrical leakages which can become
ignition sources.
Finally we have to consider garbage. We are world-famous in
generating garbage on the ground. In flight we have what I consider
a major problem, depending on how often the trash man comes by. If
we get a crew transfer every four months, for example, that might
mean many bags of mixed organic discards (food scraps, medical
waste, packaging, etc.) which will develop offensive odors and toxic
gases which are the result of biological action which is exothermic
and which has been the cause of fires of "unknown" origin or, more
properly, spontaneous ignition.
CONCLUSION
What all this says to me is that the designer has a major
responsibility in making spacecraft fire-safe, but so has the
customer. A comprehensive study clearly shows that the greatest
probability of an accidental fire will most likely include GFE, and
that area, therefore, is in greatest need of attention today. In view
of all these considerations it appears to me that an integrated study
of the final design is mandatory, and if conducted by a truly
objective body can contribute to the reduction of fire hazards.
Eagle Engineering
17 October 1991
J. H. Kimzey,
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A PERSPECTIVE ON
THE NASA FLAMMABILITY SCREENING TEXT
DESIGN TO CONTROL
AN IGNITION SOURCE WILL ALWAYS EXIST AND A FIRE
CAN START
A FIRE MUST BE SELF-LIMITING WITHIN A SHORT
DISTANCE FROM ITS IGNITION POINT
EXPOSED MATERIALS SHALL BE SELF-EXTINGUISHING
EITHER INHERENTLY OR IN CONFIGURATION;
I.E., BY LIMITATION OF THE AMOUNT, SPACING,
OR ACCESSIBILITY OF THE MATERIALS
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
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QUESTIONS
IS NORMAL GRAVITY FLAMMABILITY ALWAYS GREATER
THAN MICRO-GRAVITY FLAMMABILITY ?
IS NASA UPWARD SPREAD TEST A WORST CASE TEST
FOR NORMAL GRAVITY FLAMMABILITY ?
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
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APPROACH:
COMPARE BEHAVIOR OF A SET OF MATERIALS IN NAS_
TEST AND IN STANDARD NIST TESTS
OBTAIN A PERSPECTIVE ON WHAT IT MEANS TO
PASS NASA TEST AND LOOK FOR CORRELATION
IN BEHAVIOR BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF TESTS
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
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NIST TESTS
• IGNITION DELAY TIME AS A FUNCTION OF INCIDENT
RADIANT HEAT FLUX
• RATE OF HEAT RELEASE AS A FUNCTION OF INCIDENT
HEAT FLUX
• LATERAL FLAME SPREAD RATE AS A FUNCTION OF
INCIDENT HEAT FLUX
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
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MAI"_RIALS FOR NIST FLAMMABILITY TESTIN_
POLYURETHANE FOAM (FOAMEX, EDDYSTONE,
PA.); 2.54 CM THICK
COTFON TON-KIIfNG; 86% (%YlXDN/14% POLYESTI_
(DUNDEE MILLS, GRIFFIN GA. ) ; = 7 mm thk.
-- LEXAN POLYCARBONATE SHEEr (GENERAL EI__C)
-- 9034, _ARDED; 1.6 mtn THK
-- 9600, RETARDED; I. 6 nxn THK.
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
SOURCES OF "EXTERNAL" RADIATION
NEARBY BURNING OBJECT:
SELF-FEEDBACK:
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
MATERIALS FOR PHASE 2 OF STUDY
COi-ION TOWELLING
THK.
(COTTON/POLYESTER); = 7 MM
- LEXAN 9034 POLYCARBONATE; 1.6 MM THK.
-- NOMEX POLYAMIDE CLOTH; 6.80Z,fYD 2
-- FLAME RETARDED COTTON CLOTH; 6.00Z/YD 2
-- EPOXY/GLASS CIRCUIT BOARD; 1.6 MM THK.
-- KYDEX PVC/ABS BLEND; 1.6 MM THK
T. Ohlemillcr, NIST ]67
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SUMMARY / CONCLUSIONS
MATERIALS PASSING THE NORMAL NASA TEST ARE
FLAMMABLE, EVEN IN AIR, IF SUBJECTED TO
VARYING AMOUNTS OF INCIDENT RADIATION.
NIST TESTS PROVIDE A MORE COMPLETE,
QUANTITATIVE PICTURE OF THIS FLAMMABILITY
BUT IT CANNOT PRESENTLY BE RELATED TO
NASA UPWARD FLAME SPREAD BEHAVIOR.
PRE-HEATING A MATERIAL OFFERS A RELEVANT
QUANTITATIVE MEASURE OF CONDITIONS THAT WILL
YIELD UPWARD FLAME SPREAD.
THERE IS A NEED TO "CALIBRATE" THE RELATION
BETWEEN PRE-HEATED FLAMMABILITY ENHANCEMENT
AND RADIATIVE SELF-FEEDBACK ENHANCEMENT.
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
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RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA CONSIDER ADOPTING A MODIFIED VERSION OF ITS
STANDARD TEST THAT INCORPORATES RADIATIVE
PRE-HEATING. APPLY AS A SUPPLEMENTAL TEST
TO MATERIALS THAT ARE PRESENT ABOVE SOME
THRESHOLD LEVEL.
PURSUE THE ISSUE OF NORMAL GRAVITY VS. MICRO-
GRAVITY FLAMMABILITY ON A MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE
SCALE THAN AT PRESENT.
T. Ohlemiller, NIST
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GRAVITY EFFECTS ON SMOLDERING OF
POLYURETHANE FOAM
Carlos Femandez-Pello
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
Work sponsored by NASA under Grant #NAG3-1252
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SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
Smoldering takes place in porous combustible materials, and is charac-
terized by a non-flaming surface combustion reaction that propagates
throughthe material interior.
The propagation of the smolder reaction is controlled by the transfer of
heat from the reaction zone to the virgin material, and the transport of
oxidizer to the reaction zone, which is often limiting in smoldering.
The transition from the surface reaction (smoldering) to a gas-phase reac-
tion (flaming) is also an important aspect of the problem.
Feruandez-Pello, UC Berke{_
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SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIMENT
Smolder important as a fire safety problem - Transition to
flaming.
Microgravity introduces questions about the transport of
oxygen to the reaction zone (diffusion) and transfer of
heat from the reaction zone (conduction).
It appears that oxygen contained in porous fuel is
sufficient to sustain smolder (diffusion of oxygen may be
unimportant).
In microgravity conduction of heat is the only transfer
mechanism. (Still air good insulator.)
C. Fernandez-Pello, UC Berkeley
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EXPECTED SMOLDER BEHAVIOR IN MICRO-GRAVITY
Micro-gravity will eliminate convection, thus increasing the insulation of
the fuel but also reducing the oxidizer transport. The increase in insula-
tion will aid the smoldering process, flaming may occur in the area near
the ingiter, mainly in the zones more exposed to the outside. So if
flaming can occur it is more likely to occur at the beginning of the exper-
iment and be visible. We are not sure if diffusion can transport enough
oxidizer for flaming to occur.
Ground-based experiments seem to indicate that transport by diffusion
may be enough for smoldering to occur. The oxidizer inside the high
void fractio fuel (97.5%) aided by the oxygen diffused from the ambient
seem to be enough to sustain smoldering. Because of the decrease in the
heat losses, we expect a steady seN-sustained (but weak due to very res-
tricted oxygen supply) smoldering. The velocity of the smoldering front
should be of the order of 0.02 mm/sec.
C. Fernandez-Pello, UC Berkeley
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Outline
- Background on Smoldering
Normal gravity experiments
- Opposed smoldering
- Forward smoldering
Drop-Tower micro-gravity experiments
- Smolder ignition
KC- 135 - variable gravity experiments
- Smolder near an interface
- Opposed smoldering
C. Fernandez-Pello,
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LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER 2,2 SECOND DROP TOWER
DECELERATION
S_KE$
EXPERIMENT IN
PREDROP POICTION
PREP AHD
CHECKOUT
AREA
DECELERAT7
CONTAINER
ll]i
TYPICAL FLOOR PLAN
TOWER: 6.4 metePI (21 ft) equsre by 30.5 meter (100 PI] tall
DROP AREA: 27 m.etenl (89 ft) till And APace eectlA_ of 1.$ by 2.75 meters (S by g ft)
RECOVERY SYSTEbI: 2.2 meter 17 Pit deep ¢emelMr rlth aired
GRAVITATIONAL ACCELERAT]OI_. 10-1G'a far 2.2 eece_d_
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Data From Drop Tower Ignition Tests
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